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NATIONAL SECURITY EFFORTS TO DISRUPT THE
MOBILITY OF TERRORISTS
Keynote Addresst
Susan Ginsburgt t
I. Opening Remarks
Thank you, Aaron Clay, Anwar Imam, the rest of the International Law Re-
view staff and Professor Moses, for giving me an opportunity to speak before
such a distinguished group of immigration law practitioners, policy leaders and
such a dedicated group of law students. I am also pleased to be speaking in the
city that is home to one of the 9/11 Commissioners, Governor Thompson, with
Ambassador Perry, and the other distinguished panelists. As the daughter of a
refugee from Nazi Europe, I share your belief in the central importance of the
international legal framework for migration. And as a very engaged board mem-
ber of an NGO involved in development projects all over the world, I value your
contributions to define what it means for the United States to be a responsible
member of the global society of nations.
The work you are doing through this symposium - advancing global society
through a deeper understanding of international migration and its impact on op-
pressed individuals - is in the great tradition of Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
I clerked for Judge Higginbotham. I dedicate these remarks to Judge Higginbot-
ham. And I applaud you for undertaking his mission and the hard work it entails.
II. Introduction
My focus at the 9/11 Commission was on the travel tactics of Al Qaeda's 9/11
conspirators, especially the entry of the hijackers. Since Congress' mandate dealt
exclusively with the 9/11 attacks themselves, we only lightly touched upon the
broader ripple effects on immigration, refugee, and asylum policy called forth by
9/11 that continue to this day.' This revealed links between two sets of phenom-
ena - terrorist mobility and international migration. For economic, political, and
social reasons, including its organized criminal underside, the link between ter-
rorist mobility and international migration needs to be considered much more
formally and carefully. This is essential in order to find ways to preserve the
important goals and principles at stake in recognizing and defeating our enemies,
f The Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Symposium on International Migra-
tion: Examining the Legal Implications in a Global Society, February 24, 2005.
tt Ms. Ginsburg was the Senior Counsel of The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (9/11 Commission) and the former Senior Advisor in the Treasury Department's Office
of Enforcement. She was also a Law Clerk for the Honorable Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., of the
3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, and has worked in the State Department's Bureau of International Narcot-
ics Matters.
Intelligence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2003 Public Law 107-306 (2002).
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in upholding human rights, and in advancing prosperity is an undertaking essen-
tial to our future as a nation and as a world leader.
As a necessary foundation for a broader dialogue about security and migration,
I would like to share my perspective, which comes primarily from a close study
of a small group of terrorists. First I will discuss the new enemies and the new
type of war that was the broad subject of the Commission. Then I will turn to
what the United States is doing, as a nation, to counter the international flow of
terrorists and their ability to enter the United States.
III. A New War with New Enemies - Terrorist Mobility
Today's transnational mobile terrorist groups and individuals operate under
cover and seek ways to exploit our immigration and transportation systems to kill
people as we go about our daily lives. Safeguarding our citizens and people with
whom we engage now depends heavily on preventing specific individuals from
gaining access to the United States, to places at home, here and abroad, where
Americans and American interests may be targeted.
Detecting and carrying out clandestine travel created some compelling Cold
War spy dramas. In the last half of the last century, identifying and locating
individuals has been a marginal problem for intelligence and national security
professionals as compared with assessing the movements of conventional forces
or the status of nuclear weapons.
In the law enforcement arena, some prosecutions of pre-9/11 Islamist terrorists
involved in the first World Trade Center and later plots, were for immigration
violations, including the use of fraudulent travel documents. 2 However, illegal
terrorist travel had no impact on the thinking about laws and enforcement poli-
cies relating to international migration, or refugee and asylum rules and
procedures.
Al Qaeda itself was intensely focused on international travel and immigration
processes throughout the world. By 1998, Al Qaeda had a governing and organi-
zational structure that included a passport office as part of its security function.
3
The passport office handled international travel and developed a number of
schemes to keep Al Qaeda operatives supplied with secure travel documents. 4
The visa policies of various countries emerged as a factor early on in the plan-
ning of the 9/11 attacks. For example, Khaled Sheik Mohamed realized that two
Yemenis who volunteered for suicide operations would not be able to obtain
visas as easily as Saudis, particularly to the United States. 5 He decided to split
2 Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, A
STAFF REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 48-58
(2004) [hereinafter 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL] available at http://www.9-1 lcommission.gov/staff_
statements/91 lTerrTravMonograph.pdf#search='9%2F 11%20and%2OTerrorist%2OTravel%2C%20A
%2OStaff%20Report%20of%20the%2ONational%20Commission%20on%2OTerrorist%2OAttacks%20
Upon%20the%2OUnited%20States'.
3 Id. at 61; see also Nat'l Comm'n on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, THE 9/11 COMMIS-
SION REPORT, 168-69 (Norton 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
4 Id. at 69.
5 Id. at 156.
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"the planes operation," what became the 9/11 plot, into two components. 6 One
would be in the United States. The other would involve hijacking planes, proba-
bly originating in Thailand, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Malaysia, where
Yemenis would be able to enter without visas. 7 This latter part of the scheme was
never carried out.
As these facts make clear, terrorist mobility is one of the critical new dimen-
sions of national security. Today, national security interests require the United
States to learn where terrorists are, how they cross borders, how they use trans-
portation, and how they by-pass immigration controls; and then develop the
means to detect, track, intercept, disrupt, and deter them. These are core security
challenges. And the United States is just beginning to figure out how to accom-
plish them.
IV. Eliminating Terrorist Mobility
Eliminating terrorist mobility is only one aspect of counterterrorism and it
presents the same fundamental issues as the broader problem:
0 What methods will actually work to prevent terrorists from exploiting
international travel routes, and from entering the United States now, and
also reduce the likelihood that they and terrorists generally and transna-
tional criminals will do so in the future;
0 How to achieve these solution while and still preserving a free, just,
and compassionate society, one that is a welcome guide and sought-after
global partner as well as a security leader among nations; and
0 How to stop terrorist mobility and access to targets with the minimum
disruption of vital global travel and commerce.
I want review the actions taken by the U.S. government to resolve these ques-
tions on terrorist mobility. Then I want to share some ideas on where we need to
be going in the next phase of our efforts in preventing terrorists from gaining
access to U.S. targets here and abroad.
0 First, there have been major improvements in the watch listing pro-
gram, especially in giving access to state and local agencies. 8 This is
making better intelligence more broadly available about known terrorists.
0 Second, for non-citizens entering and exiting the United States, a bio-
metric identification system is being developed that will be linked to im-
migration records. 9 From a counterterrorism perspective, biometric
identification should make the use of multiple aliases and name spellings
less effective. In addition, travel records linked to biometric identifica-
tion can be the source of new leads once someone has been revealed as a
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of the Inspector Gen'l Audit Div., REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREEN-
ING CENTER, Audit Rpt. 05-27 (June 2005) available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/tsc.pdf.
9 US-VISIT program available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=91.
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terrorist. The success of this program is premised on an effective regis-
tered traveler program that permits known travelers to move quickly
through border points so that inspectors have time to deal with travelers
who are not easily identified.
0 Third, there is ongoing reorganization of government, from the estab-
lishment of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) l° to the forma-
tion of new intelligence structures and organizational components
mandated by the Intelligence Reform Act. I ' The goal of reorganization is
to break down barriers among government entities so that crucial infor-
mation can be shared, and to streamline government's ability to act
quickly in a coordinated way.
. Fourth, there is an ongoing dialogue with agreements with Mexico,
Canada, the European Union, other governments and regional organiza-
tions covering border control standards and related intelligence sharing.
With Europe, the dialogue in the G-8 followed the precedent of discus-
sions on human smuggling and trafficking that began in the 1990's.
. Finally, there have been substantial increases in border patrol enforce-
ment and a series of immigration civil and criminal enforcement initia-
tives at least nominally linked to counterterrorism but that have had a
significant impact on migrants without terrorist associations.
The United States is still at the beginning stages of each of these activities, and
continues to encounter difficult substantive, procedural, and political problems.
It is not clear, for instance, which department is accountable for making sure
the terrorist watch list is comprehensive and accessible by all parties that can
benefit from it.12 Nor is it clear what the U.S. plan should be for promoting
international sharing of biometric information about terrorist suspects while pro-
tecting privacy.
However, what is clear is that more protections for individuals from govern-
ment excesses and mistakes need to be included in the new systems being de-
signed. The watch list system still designates members of Congress and senior
military and law enforcement officials, as well as less prominent but equally
trustworthy persons as being unacceptable flight risks, and then is unable to cor-
rect the error in a timely way. It is difficult to have confidence in such a system,
and not to be concerned about the prospect for egregious false positives in the use
of the many innovative technologies that are the topics of research and
discussion.
Mistakes have been made in balancing anticipated security benefits with pro-
gram costs. The unquantifiable costs in the lives of individuals and the perspec-
10 Homeland Security Act of 2002 5 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
11 Inteffigence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. I08-409 §§ 7211-7214, 118 Stat.
3638, 3825-3832 (2004).
12 DHS Inspector General Report, DHS CHALLENGES IN CONSOLIDATING TERRORIST WATCH LIST
INFORMATION, OIG-04-21, (2004) available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/OIG-04-31-
WatchList.pdf.
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tives and interests of foreign governments affect the United States ability to
persuade other governments to cooperate with the United States.
Ineffectiveness from a counterterrorism perspective is another problem. The
Alien Absconder Initiative launched after 9/11 sought to find and deport nearly
6,000 people of certain nationalities who had ignored valid removal orders.' 3
Although some may have been important criminal offenders, none had been
found during immigration proceedings to be associated with terrorism. None
were prosecuted or removed from the United States on terrorism grounds. Four-
teen individuals were referred to the FBI for further investigation relating to pos-
sible terrorist links, but the 9/11 Commission did not learn of any confirmed
terrorist links. 14 To build confidence in U.S. counterterrorism efforts here, the
resources have to be focused more productively.
Government law-making processes can be a double-edged sword; in the midst
of a crisis, the United States is not good at making long-term policy decisions,
even when given the luxury of time, it is often impossible to force through diffi-
cult decisions.
The post-9/11 crisis atmosphere and political conflict about immigration, com-
bined with the actual unenforceability of current laws and the need in a demo-
cratic society for fair and equitably enforced administered laws, have blurred
distinctions between the migration and security policy. As a consequence,
counterterrorism is competing, at least indirectly, for resources with immigration
enforcement in the necessary efforts to prevent terrorist entry and constrain ter-
rorist mobility.
Three broad areas mark the next phase in building a domestic and international
framework that constrains terrorist mobility. These three areas include eliminat-
ing terrorist mobility, using knowledge effectively, and reducing transnational
organized crime.
A. Restricting Terrorists' Movements
Eliminating terrorist mobility must become a major focus of our defensive and
offensive security efforts. This new objective should include at least four
elements:
* Using the Achilles heel of the need to travel to find individual ter-
rorists as they make travel plans, use transportation, and cross borders;
* Dismantling the infrastructure for illegal terrorist travel, through ac-
tions against human smuggling and trafficking networks that have terror-
ist customers, and against corruption among border and immigration
officials and other governmental and civil society institutions, and vulner-
able travel agents;
• Encouraging accessible, efficient, and secure international travel as a
foundation for global prosperity, justice, and international understanding;
and
13 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, supra note 2, at 152-55.
14 Id.
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0 Preventing terrorists from successful clandestine entry into the United
States and access to vulnerable facilities, which is the existing homeland
security mission.
Eliminating terrorist mobility requires a full spectrum intelligence program -
collection, analysis, technology development, human intelligence - specifically
dedicated to the transportation practices and travel patterns of terrorists. It means
an investment in new efforts to track and monitor terrorists. It means making an
effort to anticipate where terrorists are going and what vulnerabilities they will
exploit, including their responses to changes business and government make in
the transportation and travel systems.
The new National Counterterrorism Center' 5 and the Department of Homeland
Security will have to harness the efforts of the intelligence community, the bor-
der agencies, all levels of law enforcement, and also the private sector, to build in
this new dimension of security.
As this effort is shaped, it will compel new procedures and regulations in the
fields of international relations and law, civil liberties, and the public-private sec-
tor relationship to answer issues such as what means are permissible in tracking
suspected terrorists in foreign countries and what standards are applied to deter-
mining whether a foreign government is providing sufficient cooperation.
B. Knowledge Management: New Tools
In order to detect and intercept the few truly dangerous people in the flow of
hundreds of millions of travelers, we need to collect, manage, analyze, and use
information better.
New Technology
There is much discussion about sophisticated new technology to do this: fa-
cial heat sensors to detect stress; automated video cameras that use algorithms to
detect anomalous movements and relay these discordant patterns to human ana-
lysts; and analysis of merged data systems to search for patterns and anomalies in
those patterns. None of these technologies are actually developed, and even
when developed will present serious questions of effectiveness and privacy.
In the short term, more emphasis needs to be placed on using available infor-
mation about current terrorist practices to institute preventive measures. There
are a few examples of potentially effective knowledge management systems to
support counterterrorism.
Analyzing Investigative Information
Some of the terrorists who carried out the first World Trade Center attack and
those implicated in later intercepted plots had been prosecuted on immigration
15 Intelligence Reform Act, P.L. 108-408 §§ 7211-7214 (2004) (which established it and laid out
duties and responsibilities, Sec. 1021).
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charges or related criminal charges. 16 This meant that their FBI or INS files
contained detailed information about the tactics that they had used to cross bor-
ders and subvert the U.S. immigration system.
These old case files were extraordinarily revealing. They provided information
that could have been used to intercept some of the 9/11 hijackers, and to contrib-
ute to a detailed picture of the terrorist travel and immigration infrastructure.
Information like this can support not only preventive measures here, but diplo-
matic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts abroad.
For example, one of the terrorists had obtained a small batch of fraudulent
Nicaraguan passports after a major Nicaraguan earthquake; citizens lost their
documents and the government re-issued passports in large numbers in a short
period of time.' 7 Preventive measures could involve special checks on Nicara-
guan passports issued during a certain period. Diplomatic efforts might involve
offering assistance to upgrade passport security systems following natural disas-
ters that make them vulnerable to less than rigorous issuance practices. Intelli-
gence and investigative efforts might involve efforts to discern wider use of such
passports among terrorist groups or in illegal passport markets. Law enforcement
efforts might involve prosecutions of officials who misuse the passport issuance
process or middlemen who profit from it by placing people at risk from crime or
terrorism, along with publicity against such practices. To bring about such prose-
cutions, international dialogue and agreements about appropriate penalties and
enforcement policies need to be developed.
The FBI's lack of a case management system is only one manifestation of how
far we have yet to go to manage and exploit available knowledge about terrorist
travel for the purpose of adding security to international travel. Law enforcement
agencies generally have historically conducted their mission through case-by-
case investigation to support prosecutions. The mining and recycling of investi-
gative and incident information to find trends and patterns to support new
counterterrorism or crime control measures, only some of which might involve
prosecutions, is for the most part insignificant in the current environment. It
would represent a major cultural change for most law enforcement agencies. This
is one type of knowledge management that will make a difference.
Incident reviews
Incident reviews are a second type of knowledge management that can help
constrain terrorist mobility and access. Today we don't study how terrorists ac-
tually manage to get in or try to get in, immediately after the discovery that they
either entered or attempted to enter, and we should. A high level and high qual-
ity terrorist entry review system, activated immediately upon the discovery of
any terrorist entry, with objective and thorough analysis and recommendations -
and avoiding political attack and blame - would go a long way toward building
16 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, supra note 2, at 48-58.
17 Id. at 52.
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the kind of government and public confidence needed to reduce the harm from
future attacks.
Travel and identification documents
Travel and identification documents are another much-neglected source of
knowledge about terrorists. Name and biometric-based screening largely depend
on intelligence, law enforcement, or immigration authorities having already pro-
vided information about the individual. The 9/11 Commission found that as
many as 15 of the 19 hijackers had travel documents containing terrorist indica-
tors, even though most of them could not have been detected as terrorists by
checking their names, biometrics, or previous travel to the United States.
These document indicators were analyzed after 9/11. Most specialized terror-
ist indicators on documents are knowable only through intelligence reporting and
analysis, including knowledge shared by friendly governments. For instance, the
mark of a particular inspector who has been previously associated with terrorists,
or a particular type of forged stamp, or a particular passport number provided by
a source can only be known if this information is disseminated.
Document screening usually comes later in the travel process. Moreover, it
isn't fully computerized, and most importantly, it is not linked with intelligence
information. There is simply too much information for an inspector to retain and
some of it requires special technology to detect. As a result, many inauthentic
documents are not detected. When an inspector does detect a fraudulent docu-
ment, because of a detectable flaw, perhaps using a black light or based on an
alert notice, there is no systematic interagency process to determine whether
those or other travel documents may have terrorist or organized crime sources.
Thus, the individual who is deported with or without fraudulent documents may
be a criminal or terrorist at liberty to try again.
From a counterterrorism perspective, the immediate challenge is in building
the right set of linkages between the intelligence community that is needed to
enable all agencies to decipher these documents fully and assist in deciding what
actions are appropriate, and the immigration and law enforcement officials that
encounter the travel and related identification documents in the first instance.
Focusing more on harnessing the knowledge base of law enforcement and the
intelligence community on what terrorists are actually doing will have two im-
portant consequences. Trained terrorists use fraudulent practices to cross bor-
ders, and these are sometimes indistinguishable from other travel fraud. As
knowledge of terrorist and criminal tactics increases, more fraud is also likely to
be detected, and more migrants with no connection to terrorism who are attempt-
ing illegal entry will be detected. This makes continuing political dialogue about
migration policies, including enforcement policies, all the more urgent.
At the same time, information collection, analysis, and enforcement informa-
tion based on continuous, systematic examination of terrorist and criminal prac-
tices will shift law enforcement to focusing on suspect individuals and
organizations, based on valid indicators, rather than on broad groups based on
national origin or religion. This makes for a more just as well as more effective
176 Loyola University Chicago International Law Review Volume 2, Issue 2
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security strategy. Since this approach places less emphasis on unfettered
searches through citizen records, it also focuses the privacy concerns more
narrowly.
C. Transnational Organized Crime
Transnational organized crime is the final major area of action that deserves
more attention than it has received. Transnational organized crime is heavily
involved in terrorist travel. Just as there needs to be shift toward using informa-
tion differently, there needs to be a shift towards working to persuade and sup-
port law enforcement organizations and related organizations not to just arrest
violators, but to adopt the goal of controlling crime.
Al Qaeda successfully gained access to the U.S. because it relied on a combi-
nation of successful deception, in-house forgery, stolen passports, and tapping
into the network of organized criminal document forgers, human smugglers, and
corruptible or sympathetic travel agents and officials. 8
The United States needs to develop detailed knowledge about the criminal
travel and transportation infrastructure, and work with allies in other nations to
achieve better results in controlling the suppliers. This means writing new laws,
creating new international norms, and finding more effective methods of
deterrence.
The work done by the migration community in the 1990's on human smug-
gling and trafficking enforcement is providing a foundation for a sharpened focus
on terrorist travel. This is one area where an infusion of new resources is likely
also to benefit international efforts to fight human trafficking at the diplomatic
and enforcement levels.
The chaos at our southern border and the lack of focus on vulnerabilities of the
northern border pose a significant security issue. About 300 separate entities in-
volved in people smuggling have been detected, and the number of arrests of
illegal entrants is enormous.1 9 As the ability to detect false passports and identi-
ties improves, the use of these channels to enter the United States becomes more
attractive to terrorists.
V. Conclusion
What is even more dangerous to the United States is the lack of consensus on
what to do about this grave risk. Political gridlock about immigration policy
leaves the United States vulnerable to extreme responses and future terrorist at-
tacks. Managing migration consistent with security, human rights, and economic
requirements is becoming more critical every day.
My hope is that we will find solutions that are in the tradition of Judge Higgin-
botham: never leaving out of the formulation consideration of the poor and op-
pressed who are struggling to better themselves and join society on equal terms.
18 9/11 AND TERRORIST TRAVEL, supra note 2, at 58-60.
19 Mexican people-smuggling trade worth billions, JANE'S INTELLIGENCE REVIEW 30 (Dec. 2004).
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